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Abstract 
Atomically precise manufacturing (APM) is the assembly of materials with atomic precision. 
APM does not currently exist, and may not be feasible, but if it is feasible, then the societal 
impacts could be dramatic. This paper assesses the net societal impacts of APM across the full 
range of important APM sectors: general material wealth, environmental issues, military affairs, 
surveillance, artificial intelligence, and space travel. Positive effects were found for material 
wealth, the environment, military affairs (specifically nuclear disarmament), and space travel. 
Negative effects were found for military affairs (specifically rogue actor violence) and AI. The 
net effect for surveillance was ambiguous. The effects for the environment, military affairs, and 
AI appear to be the largest, with the environment perhaps being the largest of these, suggesting 
that APM would be net beneficial to society. However, these factors are not well quantified and 
no definitive conclusion can be made. One conclusion that can be reached is that if APM R&D is 
pursued, it should go hand-in-hand with effective governance strategies to increase the benefits 
and reduce the harms. 
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1. Introduction 
Atomically precise manufacturing (APM) is the assembly of materials with atomic precision. 
APM is also known as molecular assembly or molecular manufacturing, and is a form of 
molecular nanotechnology. APM does not currently exist, and some nanotechnology researchers 
doubt that it is feasible (e.g., Smalley, 2001), but those who believe it is feasible anticipate a 
wide range of transformative societal impacts (e.g., Drexler, 2013a). The best-case scenarios are 
incredible, featuring benefits on par with the industrial and computer revolutions. Worst-case 
scenarios are catastrophic, with harms up to and including human extinction. 
 
The uncertain feasibility of APM and the wide range of potential impacts make for a difficult 
governance challenge. It is hard to know whether APM research and development (R&D) should 
be encouraged, discouraged, or simply ignored. Thus Marchant et al. (2008) argue that 
traditional risk management approaches cannot be applied to APM. For example, the 
precautionary principle could suggest that APM R&D should be discouraged until it is clear that 
APM could not cause catastrophe, or it could suggest that APM R&D should be encouraged on 
grounds that it could help prevent other catastrophes. To the extent that prudent risk management 
demands a full accounting of the risks, and, more generally, that prudent governance demands a 
full accounting of the relevant factors and issues, it is not readily clear what society should do 
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about APM. 
 
In order to bring some clarity to the issue, this paper characterizes the potential societal impacts 
of APM if it is developed. The paper examines impacts across the wide range of sectors that 
APM could affect, including the environment, the military, surveillance, computing, space travel, 
and general material wealth. It seeks to understand what the net impacts on society would be, in 
particular whether they would be positive or negative, and by how much. The impacts are not 
quantified with any significant precision, as would be unwarranted for such a complex and 
uncertain future technology. However, a broad and imprecise analysis can nonetheless shed some 
light on the impacts of APM. 
 
The paper is motivated by the question of whether society should invest in APM R&D. Greater 
APM R&D investment could bring APM into existence sooner (if APM would have been 
developed anyway) or with higher probability (if APM might not have otherwise been 
developed). Whether society should invest in APM R&D depends in part on what the net societal 
impacts of APM would be. If the net impacts would be negative, then arguably there should be 
no R&D investment. If net impacts would be positive, then there may be a case for R&D 
investment, though it would also depend on other factors, including the size of the net impacts, 
the cost of APM R&D, and the attractiveness of alternative investment opportunities. Thus, 
while this paper’s analysis can inform APM R&D investment decisions, it cannot give definitive 
answers to how such decisions should be made. 
 
This interest in APM R&D decisions is a reason for the paper’s breadth across the range of APM 
impacts. One might object that this breadth makes for shallow and thus lackluster research. 
However, decisions like whether to invest in APM R&D depend on the full breadth of impacts. 
Thus, there is a need for synthesis across the potential impacts. Such synthesis additionally can 
identify important points of uncertainty where more narrow research would be of greatest value. 
This paper considers prior literature on APM impacts (e.g., Altmann, 2006; Drexler, 2013a; 
Freitas, 2006, 2007; Hughes, 2007; Timmermans et al., 2011) and extends this literature with 
original analysis on each major sector of APM impacts in order to make progress on the question 
of net societal impacts and key areas of uncertainty. The prior literature on APM was mostly 
written over 10 years ago, Drexler (2013a) being a notable exception. Much has changed since 
then, both in the world at large and the relevant literature available from other fields. This paper 
therefore offers important updates from the prior literature, in addition to its original contribution 
from aggregating a broad spectrum analysis across multiple sectors.  
 
More fundamentally, one might object that APM is too speculative and not imminent enough to 
merit attention. Indeed, while the prospect of APM was central to the establishment of 
nanotechnology as a research topic, the nanotechnology scientific community has more recently 
downplayed APM in favor of more modest and immediately achievable forms of nanotechnology 
(Selin 2007). Additionally, some ethicists argue that APM does not merit ethical analysis 
because it displaces attention from analysis of near-term nanotechnology and gives credibility to 
speculative future scenarios that may not come to be (e.g., Nordmann 2007; Nordmann and Rip 
2009; Grunwald, 2010; Jones et al., 2011). 
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One response to these concerns is that APM is perhaps not so speculative after all. As proof of 
principle, APM already exists in nature in the form of biomolecules such as ribosomes, which 
“manufacture” protein molecules as per the “instructions” they read from RNA molecules 
(Drexler, 1986; Jones, 2004; Freitas and Merkle, 2004). Additionally, rudimentary forms of 
artificial APM are now possible via scanning tunneling microscopy and atomic force 
microscopy, which are both capable of accurately analyzing and determining the atomic structure 
of samples. In fact, scanning tunneling microscopes can even move atoms to precise locations, 
building elemental atomic structures, an important step towards APM (e.g., Farrel and Levinson, 
1985; Gomer, 1986; Møller et al., 2017). Progress towards APM can also be seen in the 2016 
Nobel Prize in Chemistry, which was awarded to Jean-Pierre Sauvage, Sir J. Fraser Stoddart and 
Bernard L. Feringa for their work on controllable molecules. While these advances fall short of 
the advanced APM discussed in this paper, they do suggest its feasibility. It still remains possible 
that APM may never be built, but the possibility should not be dismissed. 
 
Roache (2008) provides two additional reasons for early attention to speculative future 
technologies like APM. First, analysis of the merits of R&D can be of particular value while the 
science and technology remain immature and thus more governable. Once a field of science and 
technology grows large, it gains inertia in the form of institutional buildup and scientists’ and 
technologists’ professional investment. This makes it harder to restrict, even if analysis finds it to 
be dangerous. To be sure, early analysis is also more ambiguous, since important details of the 
science and technology have not yet been established. This is the well-known Collingridge 
dilemma between information about a technology and the power to control it (Collingridge 
1980). This underscores the importance of early analysis of the potential impacts of a 
technology: to the extent that information can be obtained early, it is especially valuable.  
 
Second, Roache (2008) argues that seemingly unlikely future scenarios can still be worth 
attention if their potential consequences are large enough. Similarly, Ćirković (2012) argues that 
improbable theories can merit attention when they would have high stakes if they turn out to be 
true. As noted above and discussed in detail throughout this paper, the potential consequences of 
APM could be quite large indeed. The combination of APM being potentially feasible, at an 
early stage of R&D, and potentially highly impactful render it a worthy focus of research, 
especially for research that is, such as this paper, oriented towards assessing its overall merits. 
 
In order to determine the net social impacts of APM, this paper aggregates the net impacts that 
APM has to various spheres. First, the value that APM has to general society, particularly the 
social impacts of APM generated abundance. Secondly, how APM affects the environment, most 
notably how APM can be used in carbon dioxide removal and the fabrication of photovoltaics. 
Thirdly, the impacts of APM on the military and the manufacturing of new weapons systems will 
be analyzed. Fourthly, the value of APM to other surveillance technologies like cameras and 
mass surveillance networks will be discussed. Finally, the impact that APM has on the 
development of artificial intelligence (AI) as well as space travel will also be looked at in order 
to determine whether or not APM merits further investment and R&D.  
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2. Evaluative Framework 
This paper’s framework is essentially consequentialist, aiming to assess the various 
consequences of APM in terms of benefits or harms to society. This is not to say that 
consequentialism is necessarily the only correct framework for evaluating APM; we only claim 
that the consequences of APM are an important factor. The paper takes society to be the entire 
global human population that currently exists or will exist in the future.1 Furthermore, while the 
paper does not employ specific conceptions of “benefits” and “harms”, we believe the analysis is 
broadly consistent with common conceptions of welfare and related evaluative criteria (e.g., Ng 
1980; Broome 2004). Likewise, the paper’s use of “value” and related terms can be interpreted 
accordingly.  
 
APM is expected to have impacts across a wide range of sectors. Several sectors stand out as 
especially important. We propose a framework to represent and assess the potential value of 
APM R&D across these sectors based on the following equation: 
 
V = G + ε + M + Σ + A + S + X     (1) 
 
In Equation 1, V is the total value of APM; G is the value of APM for general material wealth; ε 
is the value of APM for environmental issues; M is the value of APM for military affairs; Σ is the 
value of APM for other surveillance;2 A is the value of APM to artificial intelligence; S is the 
value of APM for space travel and colonization; and X is a catch-all category for other factors, 
including factors that are currently unknown. These sectors were selected through prior literature 
on and our original analysis of APM impacts. It is possible that other sectors may also be 
important, in which case X may be large. Furthermore, Equation 1 does not account for potential 
interconnections between the sectors, and thus may not be a complete accounting of APM 
impacts. Instead, it is intended as a good starting point for the aggregate evaluation of APM. 
 
The following discussion does not attempt to quantify any of the variables in Equation 1. Each of 
them is too complex and ambiguous to quantify. Instead, the analysis aims to identify the most 
important factors for each variable, assess whether the effects are likely positive or negative, and 
start to formulate some understanding of what the net effect (V) might be. 
 
3. Characterizing the Value of APM (V) 
APM could affect several sectors of society, as modeled in Equation 1. Indeed, it may be 
difficult to restrict APM to one particular sector if that was desired. APM is a “generic” 
technology in the sense that will likely develop concurrently across multiple sectors, as has 
happened with other technologies such as computers and 3D printing (Drexler, 2013a; Koepsell, 
2009). 
 
                                                 
1 As with any analysis of impacts across broad populations, the analysis in this paper may be sensitive to the 
particular perspectives that we, the analysts, bring to bear. We have nonetheless attempted to focus on impacts that 
are widely salient. 
2 Σ is for “other” surveillance because APM surveillance can also be used for military affairs. In order to avoid 
double-counting, the military applications of APM surveillance are classified within M. 
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3.1 The Value of APM for General Material Wealth (G) 
Much of the proposed value of APM lies in its potential to create extensive, general-purpose 
material wealth, which Drexler (2013a) refers to as “radical abundance”. Drexler’s vision is 
utopian.3 Food shortages become a thing of the past. A wide range of consumer items, including 
complex technologies, become so efficient and inexpensive to produce that they could be widely 
distributed with ease. Medicine would be readily available to whoever needed it, thus eliminating 
any treatable disease. Novel nanoscale devices would eliminate all disease and extend the 
healthy lifespan (Timmermans et al. 2011; Freitas, 1999, 2007, 2010). Fundamental conceptions 
of economics would have to change as supply and demand under scarcity is replaced by an 
effectively infinite supply at negligible production costs.  
 
However, there is reason to believe that an increase in material wealth could bring little or even 
zero increase in human quality of life. Economic theory makes heavy use of the concept of 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption—essentially, a dollar is worth more to a poor person 
than to a rich person. Already, much of the world’s population is quite rich by historical 
standards. Meanwhile, global poverty is slowly but steadily diminishing (Chandy and Gertz, 
2011). The fastest growing economies are in poorer countries, particularly Africa, and they are 
continually catching up with the rest of the world (Robinson, 2015; Worstall, 2015), though 
gains have been diminished by a growing concentration of wealth among the world’s wealthiest 
people (Jones, 2015). Barring a major economic shock, such as from climate change, or a radical 
concentration of wealth, the world population when APM comes into existence would be even 
wealthier than it is today. APM would thus be making the rich even richer, which, per the theory 
of diminishing marginal utility of consumption, would be of limited value. 
 
Furthermore, some psychological research on quality of life suggests that the concept of 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption could actually overstate the value of material 
wealth. Some analysis of survey data about human happiness finds no diminishing marginal 
utility of consumption in at least some contexts (e.g., Easterlin et al., 2010), though this finding 
is disputed (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). Meanwhile, Lyubomirsky (2008) proposes that 
material conditions make up at most around 10% of personal happiness, with genetics being the 
largest factor and activities such as interpersonal relationships also being important. Similarly, 
Seligman (2012) proposes that the main factors in human flourishing are positive emotions like 
pleasure and gratitude, cognitive engagement in activities, interpersonal relationships, meaning 
from serving a greater cause, and a sense of accomplishment from completing projects or goals. 
 
Taken in this context, an APM-induced radical abundance of material wealth would not 
necessarily improve quality of life, and could even worsen it. Would people find fewer activities 
to pursue or less meaning in their lives if material wealth is readily abundant? How would 
interpersonal relations be affected? Would the avoidance of disease be a blessing, or would it be 
a curse in disguise by depriving people of certain types of emotional challenges to overcome? 
Answers to questions like these could determine whether APM material wealth would be a good 
thing or not. 
                                                 
3 Drexler’s work does also acknowledge some potential downsides to APM, but these are portrayed as small relative 
to potential benefits. 
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An additional factor is how the wealth from APM would be managed and distributed. All 
technologies evolve within the socio-cultural context that they are developed or introduced in. 
The introduction of new technologies often reinforces existing social norms and structures 
(Sandler, 2007). If APM and its products are restricted to a particular class or social order (e.g., 
as result of licensing costs and imposed restrictions), then the benefits of APM could exacerbate 
existing inequalities. Of particular concern is that APM could impoverish people who no longer 
have a role in the APM economy. Given the wide range of potential applications of APM across 
the economy, this could make for an especially acute case of the more general phenomenon of 
technological unemployment. Similarly, in places with weak governance structures, APM wealth 
could fuel violence between competing factions, and in places with authoritarian governance, 
APM could fuel oppression, such that the population would have been better off without APM. 
 
Taking these factors together, it appears that the value of APM for general material wealth 
depends heavily on how APM is governed as well as on other societal trends. This suggests that, 
to the extent that APM is pursued, it should be done in concert with efforts to improve human 
quality of life more generally. If this can be done successfully—and we believe that it can—then 
the value of APM for general material wealth is likely to be positive and may even be large. 
Given existing trends in economic growth and related factors, our expectation is for modest 
benefits of APM for general material wealth. 
 
3.2 The Value of APM for Environmental Issues (ε) 
Despite decades of effort, society continues to struggle with a range of major environmental 
issues. Some observers argue that solving the environmental issues requires breakthroughs in 
technological innovation (e.g., Karlsson, 2014). APM advocates posit that APM could be 
precisely such a breakthrough environmental technology, reducing environmental pollution in 
several ways (e.g., Drexler, 1986; 2013a). 
 
Perhaps the simplest way that APM could reduce pollution is through more efficient 
manufacturing. The current state of large-scale manufacturing poses a serious and growing 
environmental threat due to the large and growing global population, per-capita demand for 
material products, and the environmental impacts of existing manufacturing processes (UNEP, 
2010). Barring significant changes in consumption patterns, this threat will continue unless and 
until new methods of production are introduced. APM could offer a vastly cleaner manufacturing 
process because of its potential to precisely determine its outputs, thereby substantially reducing 
humanity’s ecological footprint (Drexler, 2013a). 
 
Another environmental application of APM is photovoltaics. Photovoltaics produce electricity 
with little-to-zero greenhouse gas emissions. In recent years, the cost of photovoltaics has 
steadily decreased, but for most of the world, it is still not competitive with fossil fuels, 
especially for base load electricity production. It has been proposed that APM could dramatically 
lower the cost of large-scale photovoltaics production and enable a switch from rare materials 
(e.g., gallium, indium) to abundant materials (e.g., iron, sulfur) while maintaining high energy 
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conversion efficiency (Battelle and Foresight, 2007; Drexler, 2013a, 2013b).4 This could greatly 
facilitate the mass phaseout of fossil fuels, thereby greatly reducing or potentially even 
eliminating humanity’s ongoing carbon footprint, bringing large reductions to climate change 
risk. Fossil fuel phaseout would additionally be of significant value to public health by reducing 
the air pollution caused by burning fossil fuels. 
 
A mass switch to photovoltaics would not solve the problem of the extensive greenhouse gas 
emissions that have already accumulated in the atmosphere. However, APM may be able to help 
with that via the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (CDR). With current 
technologies, CDR is feasible but generally expensive, and some CDR techniques also pose 
ecological risks (Tavoni and Socolow, 2013). A safe and promising CDR technique is direct air 
capture, in which manufactured devices absorb or adsorb CO2 from the air.5 Direct air capture is 
currently prohibitively expensive for large-scale CDR. The manufacturing requirement would be 
difficult but feasible, comparable to or somewhat less than the global automobile manufacturing 
industry; the greater challenge would be in the energy consumed by the operation of direct air 
capture units, which would amount to about 1% of current global energy consumption (Lackner 
et al., 2012). APM could potentially dramatically lower the cost of direct air capture by 
streamlining the manufacturing of CDR units and especially by lowering the cost of energy via 
inexpensive photovoltaics. In doing so, APM might effectively solve the climate change 
problem. 
 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of APM potentially addressing climate change. Climate 
change is an extreme global risk. Already, it is disrupting ecosystems, forcing human migration, 
and worsening meteorological disasters, among other things. These impacts are projected to get 
significantly worse over upcoming decades and centuries. Indeed, they could be large enough to 
offset any concurrent gains from economic and technological development. Worst-case scenarios 
see large portions of Earth becoming uninhabitable (Sherwood and Huber, 2010). Meanwhile, 
the struggle to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has sparked interest in technological “solutions” 
that could be even riskier (Baum et al., 2013). If APM could prevent these harms from 
happening, it would go a long way towards putting Earth’s and humanity’s futures on more 
secure footing. 
 
APM may have less impact on some other major environmental issues. For example, the loss of 
biodiversity is driven largely by habitat destruction and pollution from the livestock industry. As 
long as demand for livestock remains robust, APM would have comparatively little impact on 
biodiversity loss relative to climate change. Drexler (2013a) proposes using APM to enable 
agriculture in enclosed spaces (e.g., greenhouses), which could bring some increased 
efficiencies. Further opportunities may exist, such as in the production of “cultured meat”, which 
is meat produced from cell cultures instead of from procreated animals (Tuomisto and Teixeira 
de Mattos, 2011). APM may be able to help construct cultured meat facilities and enable the 
                                                 
4 Energy conversion efficiency refers to the portion of incoming solar energy that is converted into usable 
electricity. 
5 In absorption, the entire CO2 molecule is taken up by (i.e., is absorbed by) another substance; in adsorption, the 
surface of the CO2 molecule sticks to (i.e., adheres to) another substance. 
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process to be conducted more precisely or at larger scales. These sorts of APM applications 
could lessen biodiversity loss and the other harms from livestock pollution. The effect may not 
be as large as that for climate change, but it would still be a significant benefit. 
  
APM could pose environmental harms. These would generally be distinct from the harms from 
non-APM nanomaterials, which harm human and ecological health due to their small size and 
chemically reactive nature (UK, 2004). In contrast, APM would likely be used predominantly for 
manufacturing of larger objects from more traditional materials. The potential for environmental 
harms comes from APM enabling more manufacturing in general. While APM would in most 
contexts permit cleaner manufacturing and general environmental benefits, it could also be used 
in environmentally harmful ways. APM could make it easier to engage in deforestation, strip 
mining, deep sea drilling, factory farming, or a range of other environmentally harmful activities. 
At the same time, APM could make it easier to pursue cleaner alternatives to these activities. For 
the most part, the environmental impacts of APM would come down to how APM is used. And 
for the most part, we see humanity as striving to reduce environmental harms to the extent that 
doing so is reasonably affordable and easy, so we expect the environmental harms from APM 
would be relatively small. 
 
In summary, APM shows strong potential for very large environmental benefits and little 
potential for environmental harms. Given the extreme severity of environmental risks, especially 
climate change, the environmental benefits of APM would appear to be significantly larger than 
the benefits of general material wealth. Regardless, both effects seem to point in the same 
direction, suggesting some merit for APM R&D. 
 
3.3 The Value of APM to Military Spheres (M) 
Whereas the value of APM to general material wealth and the environment is clearly positive, it 
is possible that the value to the military sphere (more precisely, the value to society due to 
changes to the military sphere) could be negative. This is due to the fact that APM could enhance 
weapons production and disrupt geopolitical stability (Grubrud, 2003). Indeed, some have 
emphasized the military sphere as the most important effect of APM, suggesting that this effect 
could make APM a major catastrophic risk (Häggström 2016; Sandberg, 2014). However, a 
closer look at the military effects of APM shows that this is not necessarily the case. 
 
One significant concern is that APM could enable powerful new types of weaponry. For the 
military sector, APM could be used to create higher precision and higher yield weapons systems 
(Heller and Peterson, 2006). Developing novel weapons systems via APM techniques might 
increase weapon destructiveness while reducing manufacturing costs. States and other actors 
would be able to build large stockpiles of highly effective weapons at low cost. This could in 
turn affect the actors’ propensity to engage in violence. Since targets can be neutralized with 
greater success rates and at minimal costs relative to conventional weapons, they may be more 
likely to engage in violence. 
 
A related concern is that APM could initiate arms races to develop more powerful weapons 
(Drexler, 2013a, 2013b; Grubud, 2003). As APM lowers the cost and increases the 
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destructiveness of weapons, more states and nonstate actors may be inclined to build large 
arsenals. When one actor sees an adversary expanding its arsenal, that actor may seek to respond 
in kind in order to avoid being outgunned. If the arms races proceed until one side can no longer 
afford to keep up, the net result could be extremely risky because APM would enable many 
actors to build arsenals capable of unleashing massive global destruction. The world would 
become a very perilous place. 
 
However, these concerns may be overstated. First, arms races are not an inevitability. Out of the 
200 or so nations, only 10 have ever built nuclear weapons, and only two of those waged an 
open-ended arms race. Comparable arms races have not occurred with other weapons classes 
such as biological and chemical weapons. While nations do continuously enhance their military 
technologies so as to seek or maintain strategic advantage, these upgrades generally do not cause 
war. Therefore, there may never be an APM arms race, and if there is one, it might not lead to 
war (Drexler and Pamlin, 2013). 
 
One must also look at the types of weapons that APM would be used for. As a general-purpose 
manufacturing enhancer, APM could be used to produce a wide range of weapons. Therefore, to 
see what types of APM weapons to expect, one should look at what types of weapons states and 
other actors generally want. 
 
Among most states, the trend has been towards low-yield, high-precision weapons. This is the 
exact opposite of nuclear weapons, which for this reason have been labeled “dinosaurs”: large, 
sluggish, and doomed for extinction (Wilson, 2013). Precision weapons enable states to achieve 
their military and security goals with less death and destruction (“collateral damage”). It is thus 
likely that APM would be used mainly for precision weapons, not for high-yield weapons of 
mass destruction. This could enable states to achieve “winter-safe deterrence”: military arsenals 
that achieve deterrence and other security goals without risking nuclear winter or other global 
catastrophe (Baum, 2015). 
 
APM could be a significant boon for nuclear disarmament. Already, the United States is 
diminishing the role of nuclear weapons as a military option while increasing the role of 
conventional precision weapons (US, 2010). Other states, including Russia, appear interested in 
doing the same, but conventional precision weapons are currently expensive. By lowering the 
cost of conventional precision weapons, APM could facilitate bilateral Russia-US nuclear 
disarmament and eventually also disarmament among other nuclear-armed states. To be sure, the 
availability of conventional precision weapons is very much not the only factor in nuclear 
disarmament (Deep Cuts Commission, 2010), but it could play a significant positive role. 
 
A potential downside to the wider availability of conventional precision weapons is that these 
weapons are more likely to actually be used. Indeed, the massive destructive force of nuclear 
weapons is widely (but not universally) believed to have helped the world avoid major war since 
World War II. It could be argued that an arsenal of APM weapons with a low threshold of use 
could undermine geopolitical stability. However, this is an issue with all types of precision 
weapons, not just APM weapons. If anything, APM would make it easier for states to maintain 
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successful deterrence—and thereby avoid war—without risking massive destruction if deterrence 
fails. 
 
The benefits of APM for nuclear disarmament could be quite large, comparable to the benefits 
for climate change. Worst-case scenarios for nuclear war include nuclear winter, an 
environmental effect in which smoke from nuclear detonations enters the stratosphere and blocks 
sunlight, thereby cooling the surface (Mills et al., 2014). Nuclear winter could be catastrophic for 
agriculture; even a “small” nuclear war with a fraction of the current global arsenal could cause 
widespread global starvation (Xia et al., 2015). Secondary effects such as disease outbreaks 
could exacerbate the consequences. The ongoing probability of nuclear war can be difficult to 
quantify but prior analyses show that it is definitely not zero and could be quite large (Hellman, 
2008); Barrett et al., 2013). Meanwhile, progress on nuclear disarmament has been slow, in part 
because of the difficulty of procuring alternative weapons. If APM could change this, thereby 
reducing or eliminating the risk of nuclear war, then human civilization may finally be free of the 
threat of mutual assured destruction that it has lived with for decades. 
 
A more significant concern for military APM comes from the potential dangers of rogue actors, 
including rogue states such as DPRK as well as terrorist groups and other nonstate actors. Over 
the last two decades, rogue actors have been an increasingly prominent concern for the 
international community. Looking ahead, some worry that advances in certain technologies, 
especially biotechnology, could enable rogue actors to cause outsized harm, potentially even a 
major global catastrophe (e.g., Rees, 2003). APM could also enable a wider range of rogue actors 
to create powerful arsenals. APM could further make these arsenals smaller and thus easier to 
conceal. In this regard, APM could be considered similar to biotechnology. This makes for a 
major risk: a world in which small rogue groups can cause global harm is a fragile world to live 
in. 
 
However, APM could also be used defensively by the rest of the world to counter threats from 
rogue actors. While APM can make rogue actors’ arsenals smaller, it can also enable the rest of 
the world to detect smaller arsenals. Already, non-APM nanotechnology is being used for a 
variety of military sensors (Altmann, 2006); APM may be able to significantly enhance sensor 
technology and other forms of surveillance, making it harder for rogue actors to go unnoticed. 
(For further discussion of APM surveillance, see Section 3.4.) Additionally, APM could have 
applications in countermeasures, such as vaccine development for mitigating the effects of 
bioterrorism. Such possibilities could limit the harms from APM-enhanced rogue actors.  
 
The ultimate effect of military APM will depend on how it is governed. Military APM would 
likely fall under international governance regimes aimed at limiting the harms of violent conflict. 
Some APM weapons could be governed under existing treaties for nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons (Reynolds, 2001; Altmann, 2006). New treaties could also be drafted for 
other APM weapons (Wilson, 2013; Hughes, 2007). Current discussions for controlling lethal 
autonomous weapons (LAWS) serves as a case study that could be emulated and expedited once 
ubiquitous nanotechnology is available. In 2014, the United Nations Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Campaign to Ban Killer Robots raised the issue of the 
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regulation of autonomous weapons systems and initiated negotiations with state actors with the 
aim of banning lethal autonomous weapons (Sauer, 2014). Once the risk and benefits of APM 
are better understood, a similar process of international attention and regulation could take place 
in order to govern the development and use of APM weapons. Effective governance of military 
APM would tend to make the impacts better (see Gubrud, 2003) 
 
Similarly, APM technologies could also be used positively by regulatory bodies to govern the 
development and use of these weapons of mass destruction, nanoscale or otherwise. This can be 
done through the creation of precise biochemical sensors that could monitor biological and 
chemical weapons’ compliance to treaties as well counteract them if they are deployed (Altmann, 
2006; Choi, 2006). In essence, as the creation of APM weapons comes to be a reality, so could 
systems that are used to regulate them. 
 
Taking these various factors together, we find it difficult to quantify the net impact to society 
from military APM. The potential benefit from nuclear disarmament is quite large, but so is the 
potential harm from rogue actors. The effects may well cancel each other out. Whether or not 
they do would appear to depend mainly on broader trends in geopolitical relations and non-APM 
military technologies. We would tentatively expect that the net effect would be beneficial due to 
the relative dearth of rogue actors who seek to cause global destruction and the potential for the 
rogue actor risk to be attenuated by advances in surveillance. 
 
3.4 Value of APM to other Surveillance (Σ) 
Surveillance, particularly mass-surveillance, is a controversial topic. The application of APM to 
surveillance is similarly controversial. APM could potentially have a dramatic impact on the 
methods and devices used to enhance or alter current surveillance networks (Drexler, 2013a). 
Issues of freedom, privacy, and security thus loom large for APM. Any assessment of the value 
of APM for surveillance will depend heavily on value judgments on these issues. 
 
APM could enable several types of surveillance technologies, including audio/visual sensors, 
computers to store and process collected data, and equipment for networking it all together 
(Drexler, 2013a). APM sensors could be small, difficult to detect, and inexpensive to fabricate. 
These AP-surveillance technologies would make it relatively easy for a group to conduct a wide 
range of surveillance activities, including intrusive mass surveillance. For example, Anissimov et 
al. (2008) describe a scenario in which APM is used to fabricate millions of surveillance devices, 
first for foreign intelligence and later in a domestic capacity under the guise of homeland 
security. Per Anissimov et al. (2008), these devices would be small and disguised, making them 
nearly impossible to detect. 
 
As with existing surveillance technologies, APM surveillance could have a range of impacts. 
Some impacts would increase the security of society. APM surveillance could reduce crime and 
other misdemeanors. More importantly, APM surveillance could help monitor rogue military 
actors (Section 3.3) or research groups developing risky AI (Section 3.5) or other possibly risky 
technologies. Potentially, APM surveillance could enhance counterterrorism so much that it 
would deter would-be terrorists from pursuing violence in the first place, typically by making the 
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likelihood of their success low and too costly. This is known as “deterrence by denial”, and it can 
be especially effective against terrorists for whom the traditional deterrence by threat retaliation 
is ineffective, for example because they lack territory to retaliate against (Kroenig and Pavel, 
2012). If APM enables the successful monitoring of rogue military actors or risky research 
groups, it could conceivably help avert major catastrophe. 
 
A risk of APM surveillance is that it could be used as a tool of oppression. Surveillance tools 
have long been used by oppressive regimes to detect and suppress dissent. APM has the potential 
to significantly enhance this tendency. An era reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984 (1949) could 
be ushered in through the monopolization of nanomaterials and systems. A totalitarian regime 
can further tighten their grip on their citizenry. This could be done with relative simplicity 
through the affordable, unobtrusive and abundant implementation of cameras (Drexler, 2007, 
2013a; Anissimov et al., 2008). An Orwellian dystopia can be easily imagined if the ubiquitous 
use of APM surveillance technology becomes a norm. 
 
Worst-case scenarios for oppression are catastrophic. The worst would be an oppressive global 
government or global coalition of oppressive governments. Such a government would lack 
competition and thus be difficult to dislodge, making it a threat to the long-term success of 
human civilization (Caplan, 2008). Bostrom (2006) proposes that APM could enable hostile 
actors to form an oppressive world government, aided by surveillance technology and other 
tools, though Caplan (2008) posits that this is unlikely as long as enough other actors would also 
have APM and be able to counter the hostile actors’ moves.  
 
Conversely, APM surveillance could also be used to counter oppression. Inexpensive 
surveillance technology would be a boon to citizen “sousveillance”, in which citizens use 
surveillance technology to monitor for potential abuses of power (Mann et al., 2003). For 
example, in recent years, citizens have used cell phone cameras to record aggressive police 
tactics, sparking public debate about police brutality. APM could extend sousveillance capacity, 
reducing police brutality and potentially also reducing the prospects for large-scale and even 
global-scale government oppression. 
 
The net effect of APM surveillance on society could depend heavily on government policy. 
Many countries have statutes that protect the public from unwarranted surveillance by restricting 
or prohibiting the use of surveillance devices that are not in public use. However, such statutes 
have not always been enforced. New surveillance technologies can also strain existing statutes. 
For example, in the case Kyllo v. United States (2001), it was ruled that, under the terms of the 
Fourth Amendment, a warrant was required by law enforcement agencies to use a thermal 
imaging device to search private homes from a public vantage point (i.e., aerial position). APM 
could create new legal challenges regarding surveillance. Outcomes of the corresponding policy 
debates and court cases and the enforcement of the rules could largely dictate the ways in which 
APM surveillance is used. Of course, this only applies to countries that have these sorts of legal 
restrictions on surveillance. 
 
In sum, APM appears to exacerbate the familiar tension between freedom and privacy on one 
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hand and security on the other. Whether it is through oppressive practices by state actors or 
continued increases in mass surveillance, APM could potentially make outcomes worse. 
However, APM could likewise increase state security via deterrence-by-denial tactics, 
monitoring of risky research groups, and increased citizen sousveillance. It is difficult to 
establish whether the net effect is beneficial or harmful to society. This depends on uncertain 
governance details as well as contentious value judgments. 
 
3.5 The Value of APM to Artificial Intelligence (A)  
The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is of particular interest when considering the development 
of APM. AI is often considered alongside APM as a high-stakes, potentially transformative 
future technology (e.g., Joy, 2000). The AI being referred to here is generally not the AI that 
currently exists, which has human-level intelligence or greater in at most only select narrow 
domains such as playing chess or searching the internet. Instead, the AI technology of interest is 
artificial general intelligence (AGI), which has capabilities across a wide range of domains, and 
artificial superintelligence (ASI), which has significantly greater than human-level intelligence 
across these domains. Some analysts hold that ASI could bring massive benefits or harms, 
depending on how it is designed (e.g., Bostrom, 2014). 
 
One factor in ASI risk is the computer technology available to the ASI and its precursor AI 
technologies. The precursor AI can include a “seed” AI which evolves into an ASI via a process 
called recursive self-improvement, in which the AI programs successively smarter AIs and “take 
off” into an ASI. While the AI is self-improving, humans can train the AI to behave in desirable 
ways. Thus, in terms of ASI safety, a key variable is takeoff speed, meaning how quickly the AI 
goes from sub-human-level seed to super-human-level ASI. Faster takeoff gives humans less 
time to train the AI and thus a higher probability that the ASI will behave in undesirable ways. 
 
APM could increase AI risk by increasing computing speeds and making AI takeoff go faster. 
For this reason, some AI analysts have argued that AI risk would be increased if APM is 
developed before AI (Bostrom, 2014; Goertzel and Pitt, 2014; Goertzel, 2016; see also Shulman 
and Sandberg, 2010). AGI researcher Ben Goertzel expresses this concern as follows:  
 
I think this [a very fast AI takeoff] is very unlikely, but if it happens, indeed, almost all 
bets are off. As I have argued elsewhere (Goertzel and Pitt, 2012), this sort of outcome 
becomes increasingly likely as the supporting technologies surrounding AGI become 
more advanced. So if we want to minimize the odds of it happening, we should make sure 
that advanced AGI is developed as soon as possible, relative to the advancement of other 
powerful technologies such as nanotech and 3D printing (Goertzel, 2016, 61). 
 
This sort of increase in AI risk could be another major factor in the evaluation of APM, perhaps 
even comparable to the effects of APM on climate change and nuclear war risk. Some believe 
that an AI catastrophe could be severe, potentially involving human extinction (e.g., Bostrom, 
2014). The probability of such an event is not well quantified due to the uncertain nature of the 
underlying technology; risk analysis of it has only recently begun and remains inconclusive 
(Barrett and Baum, 2016). 
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Another factor in evaluating the relative timing of APM and AI concerns the impacts that each 
technology could have on the other. For example, Bostrom (2014) argues that it would be better 
for AI to come before APM because AI could reduce APM risks. This is on account of AI’s 
potential ability to coordinate, manage and make decisions that are ethical in accordance with its 
training (Goertzel and Pitt, 2014). However, this argument presupposes that, in the absence of an 
AI to guide it, APM would be net harmful to society. As this paper shows, it is mistaken to 
assume that APM is net harmful (or net beneficial) without doing the analysis. It may well be 
good to hasten AI development for other reasons, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Meanwhile, early development of APM might be able to reduce AI risks by improving 
surveillance. It is sometimes proposed that AI governance should include extensive surveillance 
in order to find any group that is developing AI and ensure that they are using adequate safety 
precautions (e.g., Shulman, 2009). This sort of proposal raises significant concerns regarding 
privacy, intellectual property, and geopolitical relations, and may do more harm than good 
(Baum, 2016). However, to the extent that surveillance reduces AI risks, it could be enhanced 
through early development of APM. 
 
Estimating the net effect of APM on AI is difficult because future AI technology is so 
ambiguous. There appears to be a harmful effect from hastening AI takeoff and possibly a 
beneficial effect from improved surveillance, though the surveillance also raises other concerns. 
The net effect would thus appear to be negative, and potentially large if the risk of future AI 
catastrophe turns out to be large and if takeoff speed turns out to be an important factor. 
 
3.6 The Value of APM to Space Travel and Colonization (S) 
There is the potential for APM to contribute to space travel and space colonization. Space travel 
is not an urgent issue for human society in the same sense that (for instance) the environment or 
military affairs are. However, it is of enormous significance to the long-term fate of human 
civilization. The opportunities of space travel are quite literally astronomical. Furthermore, space 
travel remains heavily technology-limited; hence, innovation in the spheres of small, lightweight 
and highly affordable manufacturing systems could be of astronomical value.  
 
Currently, the cost of space travel is enormous, and space missions are correspondingly limited. 
With existing technology, the cost of bringing materials into space is far too great to rationalize 
using them for colonization (McKendree et al., 2005). APM could change this. APM could 
create materials that cost less, weigh less, and are more durable for space travel (Drexler, 2013a). 
APM could also enhance asteroid mining, which would further lower costs and expand 
opportunities by enabling space missions to harvest resources in nearby space locations rather 
than transporting them from Earth. Likewise, APM may enable the creation of energy sources 
that are more efficient, and more powerful, and better able to withstand the conditions of space 
travel. This could go a long way towards enabling human travel in outer space. 
 
APM could also be of great benefit for what humanity does when it arrives at new planets and 
other extraterrestrial destinations. One of the more ambitious proposals is to engage in 
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terraforming, which is the creation of livable environments on otherwise inhospitable 
extraterrestrial planets and other bodies of mass (Fogg, 1995,1998; Graham, 2004; McKay and 
Marinova, 2001). Terraforming proposals involve approaches such as using photosynthetic 
organisms to create an oxygen-rich atmosphere (Friedmann and Ocampo-Friedmann, 1995; 
Hiscox and Thomas, 1995), heating polar ice caps, such as the water-and-CO2 ice cap on Mars, 
to create a greenhouse gas atmosphere to warm the planet (Sagan, 1973; Mole, 1995; but see 
Fogg, 1995, 1998), and putting megascale mirrors in a planet’s orbit to reflect more radiation 
towards it and warm it (Birch, 1992). 
 
For each of these approaches, it is generally assumed that the process would take at least several 
hundred years to create an adequate environment. An exception is the Birch (1992) proposal for 
megascale mirrors, which is claimed to require as few as 50 years, but this proposal would 
require an engineering capacity that is well beyond what is currently available. APM could 
dramatically reduce the time and costs for each of the methods. APM would achieve this via its 
ability to make materials of small size that can be programmed to complete complex tasks 
autonomously (Drexler, 1986). Likewise, small sized APM terraforming systems would make 
them easier and less expensive to transport.  
 
The overall value of APM to space travel appears to be positive and quite large. APM shows 
promise to overcome some major technological hurdles that, at present, greatly constrain space 
travel. However, space travel is arguably less urgent than the threats to human survival that APM 
could affect, as discussed in Sections 3.2-3.5. Indeed, a single one of these catastrophes could 
harm human civilization so much that it would preclude any further space travel. Nonetheless, 
value of APM to space travel does offer a reason for APM R&D investment. 
 
3.7 Other Value of APM (X) 
Finally, it is possible that APM could have significant positive or negative value for factors not 
covered in Sections 3.1-3.6. Sections 3.1-3.6 would appear to cover the major impacts of APM 
that have thus far been identified. For any currently unknown impacts, it is impossible to 
comment on whether they would be positive or negative—otherwise, they would not be truly 
unknown. Speculation on whether such impacts would tend to be positive or negative is beyond 
the scope of this paper, and indeed may only become possible as the passage of time reveals new 
potential APM impact areas. 
 
There is one other scenario worth discussing: the so-called “grey goo” problem, a scenario where 
hypothetical self-replicating molecular machines (also called molecular assemblers) that spreads 
around the world consuming all organic matter, thereby causing the extinction of humans and all 
other Earth species, or at least all species found at the surface (Freitas, 2000; Hughes, 2007). The 
grey goo scenario has attracted extensive attention, especially in popular media (Diem, 2017; 
Torres and Boghossian, 2016; Institute of Physics, 2004; Rincon, 2004;). However, there is 
reason to not worry about it. While APM might be able to create such a thing, it would not be 
easy. APM devices could readily be designed to not manufacture grey goo. Making dedicated 
APM devices for it would require extensive technical capacity (Freitas, 2006). (Grey goo could 
potentially also be made without APM, but with even more difficulty.) Fortunately, there are few 
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people in the world who want to destroy all life on Earth, and they are unlikely to have the 
requisite capacity. So while the grey goo scenario might be possible, it is too unlikely to be a 
significant factor relative to the much higher probability scenarios captured by Equation 1 and 
Sections 3.1-3.6. 
 
4. The Overall Value of APM (V) 
What is the overall societal effect of APM? Per Equation 1, this would be the sum of the effect 
for each sector discussed in Section 3. To summarize from Section 3: 
 
● The value of APM for general material wealth is likely to be moderately large and positive. 
● APM shows strong potential for very large environmental benefits and little potential for 
environmental harms. 
● In the military sector, APM could have a large benefit from nuclear disarmament and a large 
harm from rogue actors, though the rogue actor harm could be attenuated by various 
countermeasures. 
● It is difficult to establish whether the net effect from surveillance is net beneficial or harmful 
to society. 
● There appears to be a harmful effect from hastening AI takeoff, the size of which is unclear 
but potentially large. There may also be a beneficial effect from improved surveillance, 
though the surveillance also raises other concerns. 
● For space travel, the value of APM is quite large, but it is perhaps not as urgent as the various 
threats to human civilization covered in other applications of APM. 
 
Rearranging these points, the key benefits of APM are in general material wealth, environmental 
protection, nuclear disarmament, and space travel. The key harms are in rogue actor violence and 
hastened AI takeoff. There is also a significant ambiguity in the net effect of surveillance. If 
general material wealth is a smaller factor, space travel is non-urgent, and surveillance is too 
ambiguous to factor in, that leaves a comparison between the benefits of environmental 
protection and nuclear disarmament and the harms of rogue actor violence and AI takeoff. Each 
of these factors could be quite large, so, superficially, with two factors on each side, the net 
effect may seem to be approximately zero. 
 
Taking a closer look, a case can be made that the largest factor is the benefit from environmental 
protection. Climate change is a large and well-established risk. Without APM, humanity is on 
track to largely fail to reduce the risk. With APM, it could become easy to eliminate most or all 
of the risk. Other environmental benefits, such as to biodiversity loss, could also be significant. 
In contrast, the other risks—nuclear war, rogue actor violence, and especially AI takeoff—are 
more speculative. Furthermore, for these three risks, APM would be a relatively small factor: 
nuclear war and rogue actor violence depend heavily on geopolitical factors, while AI takeoff 
depends heavily on software development. This suggests a net positive value of APM. 
 
But this conclusion may not hold. In particular, it is sensitive to the relative sizes of the risks 
from the environment, nuclear war, rogue actor violence, and AI takeoff. If rogue actor violence 
and/or AI takeoff turn out to be relatively large risks, then the net value of APM could be 
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negative. Unfortunately, none of these risks are characterized well enough to enable comparison. 
Assessing the value of APM requires an integrated analysis of each of these risks in order to 
evaluate the tradeoff between them that APM poses, such as has been proposed by Baum and 
Barrett (2017). 
 
Finally, the societal impacts of APM will depend on how society uses APM. This holds for each 
of the sectors in Equation 1 and Section 3. For example, if society uses APM surveillance to 
detect terrorists but without mass invasions of privacy, then APM surveillance could be net 
beneficial. Or, if high-performance APM computer hardware was not used for AI takeoff, then it 
would not factor into the impacts of this type of AI. Therefore, any evaluations of APM impacts 
will be contingent on future human actions. Likewise, plans for use and governance of APM 
should be factored into decisions on whether to invest in APM R&D. Such plans should likewise 
be pursued if APM is indeed being developed, in order to improve its societal impacts.6 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper has outlined and discussed several areas where APM may have especially large 
impacts, including both positive and negative impacts. We studied potential effects of APM on 
general material wealth, the environment, military affairs, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and 
space travel. Positive effects were found for material wealth, the environment, military affairs 
(specifically nuclear disarmament), and space travel. Negative effects were found for military 
affairs (specifically rogue actor violence and AI. The net effect for surveillance was ambiguous. 
The effects for the environment, military affairs, and AI seem to be the largest, with the 
environment perhaps being the largest of these, which would suggest that APM would be net 
beneficial to society. However, these issue areas are not well quantified, nor are the effects of 
APM to the issues, so no definitive conclusion can be made about the net impacts of APM. This 
paper offers a framework for evaluating the impacts of APM, but it does not offer the final word. 
 
Therefore, some caution is warranted with APM R&D. One should be conscious in opening up 
this veritable Pandora’s Box in search of utopian technologies (Ferrari and Nordmann, 2010). 
The unprecedented potential benefits of APM come with the potential for commensurate or 
greater harms. It is important to consider both potential benefits and potential harms in making 
APM R&D decisions, and to weigh them against each other. APM researchers and advocates 
should resist the temptation to focus exclusively on the potential benefits in order to promote 
R&D investment. This paper’s analysis finds some reason to believe that net benefits are likely, 
but further study could easily tip the scales in the opposite direction. 
 
Future research could resolve some ambiguities and bring more confidence to the overall 
evaluation. First, it may be possible to identify additional major impacts of APM beyond those 
covered in this paper. While this paper has aimed to include all major impacts, it is always 
possible that some have been overlooked. Assuming that nothing major has been overlooked, 
then perhaps the most urgent task is integrated analysis of the various risks that could be affected 
by APM in order to clarify their relative importance. Such analysis would of course also be 
                                                 
6 The official journal version contains a writing mistake in which the second half of this paragraph is omitted. We 
sincerely regret this error. 
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helpful for other issues related to these risks. Another key topic not explored in any depth in this 
paper is the role of governance to increase the benefits and reduce the harms of APM. Ideally, 
any investment in APM R&D would coexist with investment in good governance measures so as 
to ensure that APM is beneficial to society. Finally, a full analysis of APM R&D decisions 
should also include the cost of R&D and any other significant factors, including factors of 
relevance to ethical frameworks other than the consequentialism employed in this paper. APM 
R&D cost analysis could likewise factor in assessment of the feasibility of APM; if APM is 
found to be fundamentally infeasible, then there is no point in investing in R&D.  
 
Fortunately, there is some time available to take on these matters. APM is still in a largely 
conceptual phase. Some believe that APM will eventually be developed and widely 
implemented, but that point is not yet near. Meanwhile, there is opportunity for serious analysis 
and discussion regarding the potential governance of APM, including R&D investment. Given 
the potential effects of APM across many important societal sectors, this opportunity should be 
seized. 
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